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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8078

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN

AMCONSUL ZAGREB

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 6093

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PARM YO UN

SUBJ: YUGOSLAV VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

REF: BELGRADE 6006

1. SUMMARY: FURTHER TO REFTEL, FOLLOWING IS DISARMAMENT PORTION OF AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH FSFA ASST SECTY KOMATINA, AND COUNSELOR AND EMBOFF'S SEPARATE MEETINGS ON SUBJECT WITH FSFA UN SPECIALIST JAZIC AND DISARMAMENT OFFICIALS STEVAN KRIVOKAPIC AND DRAGOMIR DJOKIC.

2. ACCORDING TO YUGOSLAVS, TITO PROPOSED CONVENING UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSD) IN HIS COLOMBO NAC ADDRESS BECAUSE OF PRESENT NEED TO ACCOMPLISH MORE IN DISARM-CONFIDENTIAL

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AMENT FIELD; TO ENHANCE NONALIGNED AND WORLD AWARENESS TO

THIS ISSUE AND "MOBILIZE" WORLD ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM; AND TO DAMPEN THE ARMS RACE. HAVING GAINED THE NAC'S APPROVAL OF A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR CONVENING OF A UNSSD, THE YUGOSLAVS WILL BE PREPARED TO TABLE A DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THE UNGA, THEY WILL CONSULT "COOPERATIVELY" WITH ALL CONCERNED PARTIES ON "HOW BEST TO PROCEED". THEIR TENTATIVE TIMING CALLS FOR UNGA RESOLUTION PASSED BY CONSENSUS (THEY WILL CALL FOR VOTE IF NECESSARY), PREPARATORY MEETING TO REPORT TO 1977 UNGA, AND UNSSD TO CONVENE IN SPRING 1978. YUGOSLAVS BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS, WHO HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT UNSSD WOULD DETRACT FROM MOVEMENT TOWARDS A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (WDC), WOULD NOT OPPOSE UNSSD IF IT WERE LINKED TO AN EVENTUAL WDC. WE BELIEVE MAJOR YUGOSLAV MOTIVATION IS THEIR USUAL ONE OF SEEKING PIECE OF ACTION TO ENHANCE THEIR OWN POWER AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO REDUCE THE POWER OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY.

3. KOMATINA TOLD AMBASSADOR YUGOSLAVS REALIZE "WE CANNOT DISARM YOU AND THE SOVIET UNION" BUT IN PROPOSING UNSSD GOY HAD BEEN MOTIVATED BY DESIRE TO PLACE DISARMAMENT ON THE "AGENDA OF MANKIND" AMONG INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF HIGHEST PRIORITY. HE STRESSED GOY DOES NOT SEEK DISCUSSION ON DISARMAMENT "AS A ROUTINE PROBLEM." HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED ESCALATING ARMS SALES RACE AND WIDENING TECHNOLOGICAL GAP BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS AS ESPECIALLY TROUBLING ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT ISSUE, THE LATTER PREVENTING "TRUE EQUALITY AMONG PEPLES". TO AMBASSADOR'S ASSERTION THAT DISARMAMENT QUESTION IMPINGES UPON SECURITYY INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS, KOMATINA AGREED BUT ARGUED THAT ARSENALS OF THE MAJOR POWERS IMPINGE ON ALL AREAS OF INTER-NATIONAL RELATIONS IN A WAY THOSE OF OTHERS DO NOT. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT REAL PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON THE MAJOR POWERS. KOMATINA NOTED "WE MAY EFFECT YOUR RATE OF PROGRESS". KOMATINA ALSO INDICATED THAT UNSSD MIGHT "ELABORATE" CERTAIN "COLLATERAL MEASURES" OF DISARMAMENT, AND MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY IN THIS REGARD THE NPT WHICH, WITHOUT MOVEMENT TOWARD DISARMAMENT, "WOULD BE THE MOST DISCRIMINATORY TREATY EVER". CONFIDENTIAL

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- 4. EMBOFF'S SEPARATE AND LENGTHY TALK WITH KRIVOKAPIC AND DJOKIC ELICITED FOLLOWING ON SUBJECT:
- 5. YUGOSLAV THOUGHTS BEHIND PROPOSAL LAY IN: (A) GENERAL CONCERN FOR WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY; (B) WHILE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM IS VERY DIFFICULT AND THERE IS MUCH WILLINGNESS, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CONCRETE ACTION; (C) DESPITE ALL

THE ACTIVITY SINCE WWII, MORE SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED; (D) NEED FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NOT TO DIVERT FUNDS REQUIRED FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH INTO ARMS PURCHASES.

6. WHY A UNSSD: ALTHLUGH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH US AND USSR, PROBLEM OF SECURITY IS COMMON TO ALL NATIONS REGARDLESS OF SIZE. MOST NATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN AND ARE NOT PARTICIPANTS IN ANY CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. UN ROLE IN DISARMAMENT HAS BEEN LIMITED "BECAUSE THE US AND USSR DO NOT WANT AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE UN". ALTHOUGH THERE IS A FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE CCD AND UN, CCD WAS CREATED BY US-SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEDMENT AND CCD MEMBERS WERE CHOSEN BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO.

7. THEREFORE, MORE THAN 100 NATIONS DO NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO TAKE PART, ALTHOUGH ALL ARE CONCERNED. A UNSSD WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY. OBVIOUSLY, THE UN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CANNOT HELP. "THERE IS A TENDANCY FOR THE US AND USSR TO AVOID BRINGING DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS INTO A UN CONTEXT." YUGOSLAVIA'S PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE ALL NATIONS A CHANCE.

8. CALL FOR A WDC CAME FROM FIRST NAC AT BELGRADE (1961),
AND NOT FROM USSR. YUGOSLAVS HAVE HAD DISARMAMENT MEETING
IN MIND SINCE, LIMA MINISTERIAL MEETING REACHED CONCLUSION
THAT IF WDC NOT POSSIBLE IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THAN NA
WOULD EXAMINE POSSIBILITY TO CALL FOR A UNSSD. REFERENCE
AT COLOMBO NAC WAS FIRST SUCH MENTION, BUT YUGOSLAVS
HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WITH OTHERS OVER PAST TWO-THREE YEARS,
AND REACHED ASSESSMENT THAT WEC NOT LIKELY BECAUSE OF
OPPOSITION OF SOME MAJOR POWERS SUCH AS PRC AND US.
(JAZIC VERSION WAS THAT USSR AND PRC WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE.)

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9. DISCUSSION AT COLOMBO: SUBJECT WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT LENGTH AT COLOMBO. FOUR DAY MEETING DID NOT PROVIDE TIME FOR CONCENTRATED DISCUSSIONS ON ANY OF THE SUBJECTS. MANY

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SPEAKERS, HOWEVER, REFEREED TO DISARMAMENT PROBLEM ("THERE WAS A STRONG ACCENT TO THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT") AND RESOLUTION PASSED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

10. "NAC AGREED TO PROCEED IN THAT DIRECTION. PROBLEM
NOW IS HOW TO PROCEED." YUGOSLAVS WILL PREPARE A DRAFT
RESOLUTION READY TO BE TABLED AT UNGA. WILL CONSULT AT
UN WITH NA "INNER GROUP AND WITH US, SOVIETS, AND MANY
OTHERS." YUGOSLAVS PREFER NO VOTE, BUT RATHER ADOPTION
BY CONSENSUS. (JAZIC COMMENTED "WE ONLY HOPE US WILL NOT OPPOSE".)
IF NO CONSENSUS, NA NATIONS ARE OBLIGED
TO TABLE AND PUT TO VOTE. YUGOSLAVS "ARE NOT PRESSING
SPECIFIC DETAILS. WE ARE OPEN TO COOPERATION."

11. TWO-YEAR SCHEDULE: ON TIMING, TENTATIVE THINKING IS CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR SPRING 1978 UNSSD.UNGA TO ADOPT RESOLUTION THIS YEAR AND TO CHARGE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO DRAFT AGENDA. PREPARATORY COMMITTEE REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TO 1977 UNGA WHICH WILL FIX DATES; BUT UNSSD SHOULD NOT BE HELD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE A UNGA.

12. YUGOSLAV INTERESTS: KROVOKAPIC AND DJOKIC DISCLAIMED ANY SPECIFIC YUGOSLAV INTERESTS BEHIND PROPOSAL. STATED GOY IS MOTIVATED BY GENERAL INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS. WHILE GOY AWARE OF CONVENTIONS REACHED IN ARMS CONTROL FIELD, MORE CONCRETE RESULTS NEEDED IN DISARMAMENT.

13. SOVIET AND EE INVOLVEMENT: EMBOFF MENTIONED ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO NAC UNSSD PROPOSAL IN YUGOSLAV-POLISH COMMUNIOUE ISSUED AFTER RECENT VISIT TO WARSAW BY FONMIN MINIC, AS WELL AS RECENT YUGOSLAV PRESS ARTICLES CRITICAL OF SOVIET AND BLOC PRESS FOR NOT REFERRING TO UNSSD PROPOSAL. DJOKIC RESPONDED THAT YUGOSLAVS ARE NOT SURPRISED AT SOVIET/EE REACTION AND DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO SUPPORT PROPOSAL OFFICIALLY. HE STATED SOVIETS AND OTHER EAST EUROPEANS NOT HAPPY WITH UNSSD PROPOSAL BECAUSE THEY THINK A WEC WOULD BE DELAYED. SAID SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY CONSULTED WITH YUGOSLAVS ON THIS ISSUE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN. YUGOSLAVS TOLD SOVIETS THAT UNSSD NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A WDC. DJOKIC THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO OPPOSE IF 120 NATIONS WERE IN FAVOR. SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE IF THERE WERE SOME CONNECTION BETWEEN UNSSD AND A WDC. HE EXPECTS SOVIETS EITHER TO JOIN MAJORITY IN A CONSENSUS OR ABSTAIN IN A VOTE.

14. COMMENT: YUGOSLAVS ARE ZEALOUS ABOUT DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE PRESS SPACE AND ENERGIES TO IT DURING AND SINCE COLOMBO MEETING, AND SHOWING EVERY SIGN OF MAKING IT THEIR CENTRAL PUSH AS THIS FALL'S UNGA. THEY SEE THIS AS AN ISSUE NOT ONLY ON WHICH THEY CAN TAKE THE CENTER OF THE STAGE BUT ONE WHERE THEY CAN ENHANCE THEIR OWN POWER, AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT WEAKEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. ALTHOUGH LABELING IT AS A NAC RESOLUTION AND NOT TITO/YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL, THEY KNOW OTHER NONALIGNED BOTH LESS EQUIPPED AND CONFIDENTIAL

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INTERESTED TO RUN THE SHOW ON THIS ISSUE. THUS NON-ALIGNED LINKAGE DESIGNED TO MARSHAL WEIGHT OF THE NAC AND NACB IN FORCING PROPOSAL THROUGH TO ADOPTION, WHILE THEY REAP THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL BENEFITS.
RECURRING YUGOSLAV THEME IN CCD DELIBERATIONS AND ELSEWHERE IS THAT OF PREDOMINANCE OF SUPERPOWERS TO EXCLUSION OF OTHERS CONCERNED -- A MONOPOLY WHICH THEY WANT TO BREAK NOT ONLY FOR SECURITY AND POLITICAL BUT FOR ECONOMIC REASONS AS WELL. KOMATINA WAS CLEAR ON THIS POINT WHEN HE TOLD AMBASSADOR ARMS RACE WAS DRIVING FORCE BEHIND "WIDENING TECHNOLOGICAL GAP". WE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO A MAJOR BATTLE ON THIS ISSUE WITH YUGOSLAVS STRIVING TO SEIZE IDEOLOGICAL-MORAL COMMANDING HEIGHTS FROM WHICH TO RAIN

DOWN BLOWS AT SUPERPOWERS. DEFINITION OF YUGOSLAVIAA
SMALL COUNTRY WITH A MAJOR POWER COMPLEX.
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